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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE
Policy Consfrucfion-Pollcies Covering Lessor and Lessee Respectively
In General Accident Fire and Life Ins. Co. v. Piazza,' plaintiff, General
Accident, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its liability upon a
liability insurance policy issued to Ben Franklin Lines, the lessee of a truck
involved in a pending negligence act on, as against Globe Indemnity Co., the
insurer of the owner and lessor of the truck involved in the negligence action.
Both the General and Globe policies contained omnibus clauses exteading coverage
to persons using the truck with consent of the insured, and to organizations
legally responsible for its use. Both policies had exclusion clauses, however. The
General policy expressly limited coverage to excess over other collectible insur-
ance, in the case of a hired vehicle. The Globe policy contained two such clauses,
the first excluding from coverage any person or organization required by law to
carry liability insurance, the second limiting liability to a pro rata share with
other collectible insurance.
Upon appeal from affirmance by the Appellate Division of judgment that
the obligation to defend and indemnify was General's, the Court was faced with
the problem of reconciling these policies in the given fact situation. In a unani-
mous opinion, the Court reversed the courts below, holding (1) that Franklin
Lines was not required to carry liability insurance and therefore the first of
Globe's exclusionary clauses did not apply, and (2) that General's policy, being
excess and secondary by its terms, was not other collectible insurance within the
meaning of the latter of Globe's exclusionary clauses, and that therefore only
Globe was liable as insurer in the pending negligence action.
As to the first of Globe's clauses, excluding persons required to carry insur-
ance, the Court pointed out that section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law does
not require all policies of liability insurance to contain an omnibus clause
extending coverage. What is required is coverage of the owner of a vehicle for
the acts of his employee, licensee, or lessee 3 Therefore, Franklin was not required
to carry liability insurance under New York law. He was, however, licensed to
transport goods in interstate commerce. To qualify as such a carrier, a certificate
of public convenience and necessity must be obtained.4 And in* order to obtain
this certificate, a minimum amount of liability insurance is required to be carried
by the motor carrier.5 At the time of the alleged negligence, however, Franklin
1. 4 N.Y.2d 659, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958).
2. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAV, §59; N. Y. INSURANCE LAW, §167(2).
3. Kuhn v. Auto Cab Mut. Indemnity Co., 244 App.Div. 272, 279 N.Y. Supp.
60 (2d Dep't 1935), aff'd 270 N.Y. 587, 1 N.E.2d 343 (1936); see Switzer v. Mer-
chants Casualty Co., 2 N.Y.2d 575, 141 N.E.2d 940 (1957).
4. 49 U.S.C. §306 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §306 (Supp. V, 1957).
5. 49 U.S.C. §315 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §315 (Supp. V. 1957).
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was not carrying goods in interstate commerce.6 Nor were the goods being
carried under a "common control for continuous carriage," which the United
States Supreme Court has held to be carriage for interstate commerce.7 Franklin
was therefore not required to carry liability insurance under any law at the time
of the accident, and thus did not fall within the terms of the first of Globe's
exclusion clauses.
As to Globe's "other insurance" clause, the Court, purportedly applying the
intention of the policies, held that the Globe clause required prorating only with
respect to other "primary' insurance and therefore did not apply to policies such
as General's which by its terms is excess and "secondary". The basis for this
primary-secondary distinction is not made clear. It seems difficult to escape the
conclusion that the terms of these clauses make the policies mutually dependent in
respect to the extent of their liability. In order to determine Globe's liability one
must look to the General policy to see whether it represents collectible insurance.
But the coliectibility of the General policy, depending upon whether there is an
"excess", requires a determination of Globe's liability. The Court's distinction,
however, may have been based upon a resort to a general, over-all intent found in
the fact that an "excess" clause restricts liability to a greater degree than does a
prorata "other insurance" clause.
The present case is in line with the result reached by the Second Circuit8
in a case involving similar clauses. The court there stated that an excess coverage
policy is not considered "other collectible insurance," as it is not available to the
insured until the "primary" policy has been exhausted. (The court held further;
that under Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law there was no tortfeasdr
whose liability could be considered secondary; therefore, the insurer of the owner
of the vehicle involved could not avoid liability on the ground that the lessee
was the primary tortfeasor.9 )
Recently, in Ins. Co. of Texas v. Employers Liability Co.,10 a federal District
Court in California decided that an "other 'collectible" insurance clause in one
policy and an "excess over other" clause in the other policy were "mutually
repugnant," neither policy being "excess over other" collectible insurance, and
that the loss should be prorated between the policies. Since the mutual depend-
ency of the policies makes it impossible to impose liability in terms of intent, and
since the equities favor neither insurer over the other, this resolution of the
problem seems the more desirable.
6. 49 U.S.C. §303 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §303 (Supp. V, 1957).
7. U.S. v. Munson S.S. Lines, 283 U.S. 43 (1930); Baer Bros. v. Denver &
Rio Grande R.R., 233 U.S. 479 (1914).
8 Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indemnity Co., 103 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1939).
(Declaratory judgment action involving an "other collectible" clause versus an
"excess over other" collectible insurance clause).
9. Supra, note 8.
10. 163 F.Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
